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HOLA PREEMPTION AND THE ORIGINAL
INTENT OF CONGRESS: ARE FEDERAL THRIFTS
NECESSARY TO STABILIZE THE HOUSING
MARKET?
Carliss N. Chatman*
ABSTRACT
This article studies legislation, regulations, and case law to analyze
whether the Homeowners Loan Act, as well as other measures taken
to stabilize federal thrifts in the last forty years, have served their
original purpose. It also examines the impact of federal intervention
on states and homeowners and the role that federally-chartered
institutions such as banks and savings and loan associations played
in the 2008 market collapse. Over the course of this analysis,
particular attention is given to Title X of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act. This act has numerous goals
including implementing stronger consumer protections, restoring
state rights, and preventing another financial crisis, thereby avoiding
the need for government funded recovery. It is clear that federal
regulators overstepped their bounds in order to preserve federal
thrifts, infringed on the rights of states, and limited homeowner
access to justice-all in the name of promoting market stability. The
evidence proves that federal intervention worsened the impact of the
crisis. This article concludes that federal thrifts no longer serve their
original purpose and are no longer economically viable without
preferential treatment from the federal government. Since states are
in the best position to protect homeowners and institutions do not
need an incentive to engage in residential lending, it is in the best
interest of all parties to eliminate the federal thrift charter.

* Carliss Chatman is an attorney in private practice in Houston, Texas. Many thanks to
Demetria Frank, Mitra Woody and Maxine Goodman for their helpful comments on
earlier drafts.
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INTRODUCTION
In response to the worst economic crisis since the Great
Depression,1 Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank,” “Dodd-Frank Act”).2
Federal institutions played a significant role in causing this crisis,
specifically the housing market collapse, by using preemption to block
state efforts at addressing the financial meltdown.3 Dodd-Frank
repealed the regulations mandating field preemption and eliminated the
Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”), instead bringing the regulation of
1. See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Remarks at the Swearing-In Ceremony, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 3, 2010), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20100203a.htm.
2. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections
of the U.S. Code).
3. Kurt Eggert, Foreclosing on the Federal Power Grab: Dodd-Frank,
Preemption, and the State Role in Mortgage Servicing Regulation, 15 CHAP. L. REV.
171, 172–73 (2011); FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
REPORT xxiii, 13, 111–12 (2011) [hereinafter CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT], available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf.
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thrifts under the control of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(“OCC”).4 The Act also created the Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection (“CFPB” or “Bureau”).5
In the 1930s, Congress enacted the Home Owners’ Loan Act
(“HOLA”)6 and created the federal thrift charter.7 Congress considered
federal intervention necessary to the country’s recovery, and intended
for these actions to stimulate the economy and provide a resource for
home financing.8 Recently, HOLA has been the basis for removing
cases brought by homeowners from state to federal court due to field
preemption.9 After removal many homeowners’ claims are dismissed
due to the lack of a comparable federal remedy, caused in part by the
failure of the OTS to adopt consumer protection laws.10 Congress’
original intent was to create more sources for loans, not to usurp state
power and restrict homeowner access to the courts.11 Dodd-Frank
makes some effort to undo the impact of the OTS power grab by
subjecting OCC regulations to conflict preemption. Unfortunately, to
date, courts have not applied conflict preemption and have instead relied

4. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111–203, § 312, 124 Stat. 1376, 1521–22 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5412).
5. Dodd-Frank Act §1021(a) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5511) (stating that the
Bureau will draft federal consumer protection laws and monitor financial institutions of
all varieties). For more information on the Bureau, see CONSUMER FINANCIAL
PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov (last visited Mar. 24, 2013).
6. Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933 (HOLA) §§ 1–14, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461–1468c
(2006).
7. Home Owners’ Loan Act § 5 (authorizing the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
to issue charters for federal savings and loan associations). A federal thrift, also known
as a savings and loan, specializes in making mortgage loans and accepting savings
deposits.
8. See infra Part II.A. for a discussion of the purposes underlying HOLA. See
also H.R. REP. NO. 73-210, at 1 (1933) (Conf. Rep.). For a summary of the origination
of HOLA and the federal government’s involvement in home finance, see Daniel
Immergluck, Private Risk, Public Risk: Public Policy, Market Development, and the
Mortgage Crisis, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 447, 453–59 (2009).
9. See 12 C.F.R. § 560.2 (2012).
10. See Patricia A. McCoy et. al., Systemic Risk Through Securitization: The Result
of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1327, 1350 (2009) (noting
the OTS did not issue formal regulations and opposed guidance from other agencies on
nontraditional lending). For a discussion of OTS actions following the 1996
Regulations, see infra Part II.B.
11. See H.R. REP. NO. 73-210, at 1 (stating that HOLA was passed, among other
reasons, “to refinance home mortgages [and] to extend relief to the owners of homes”).
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on the fact that the Act does not apply retroactively to completely
disregard the reforms.12
In theory, the authority vested in the CFPB should create a system
of dual regulation, thereby returning power to the states while creating a
parallel system of federal measures.13 However, it remains to be seen
whether the CFPB can operate to prevent the harm to homeowners
caused by federal thrifts.14 The CFPB’s creation was subject to
extensive debate and its current operation is controversial.15 If DoddFrank’s changes are not implemented and the CFPB is abolished or its
activities limited in the name of partisan politics, homeowners and state

12. Dodd-Frank is not intended to be retroactive. Regulations and statutes cannot
be applied retroactively absent express direction from Congress. See Bowen v.
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (“[C]ongressional enactments and
administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their
language requires this result.”). Dodd-Frank provides that the governing section of the
statute was enacted and amended to become effective on the transfer date, July 21,
2011, which means that it does not apply to loans originating before that date. See
Dodd-Frank Act § 1048.
13. In the spirit of creating a federal regulatory floor, in addition to implementing
conflict preemption for regulations adopted by the OCC, the Dodd-Frank Act
§1041(a)(1) also states that the Act itself does not preempt state law except to the extent
that the state law is inconsistent with the Act, and, even then, only to the extent of the
inconsistency. Section 1041(a)(2) declares that if a state law provides greater
protection it is not inconsistent.
14. The CFPB has included mortgage related items on its short-term to do list and
has taken some action. In the preamble to the Mortgage Servicing Final Rules, issued
on January 17, 2013, the Bureau makes it clear that Regulation X does not preempt the
field of possible mortgage servicing regulation by states. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024 (2012).
On April 19, 2013, the Bureau released a proposal addressing questions related to
mortgages. The proposal includes an additional clarification that Regulation X does not
preempt the field and recommends a comment emphasizing the point. See
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201304_cfpb_proposed-rule_amending-atr-qm-andservicing-mortgage-rules.pdf at 3.
15. For example, to avoid a prolonged approval process and political debate in the
Senate, President Obama appointed Richard Cordray as director during recess in
January of 2012. 2012 Presidential candidate Mitt Romney’s economic advisors
suggested that “defanging” the Bureau would be a central item in Romney’s economic
strategy. See Suzy Khimm, The GOP’s New Push to Defang the CFPB, WASH. POST,
Feb. 8, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/post/the-gops-newpush-to-defang-the-cfpb/2012/02/08/gIQA1DrfzQ_blog.html; Janna Herron, CFPD’s
Existence
at
Stake
in
Election,
BANKRATE.COM,
Oct.
12,
2012,
http://www.bankrate.com/finance/politics/cfpb-existence-at-stake-election.aspx.
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economies will suffer while banks benefit from the same relaxed and
confusing regulatory environment that contributed to the crisis.
This article addresses a number of issues including: the need for
federal savings and loans in the context of the original purpose of
federal thrifts; the nature of our system of government; the regulatory
failures of the last decade; and Dodd-Frank’s controversial attempts to
provide a federal solution. Instead of proposing additional alternative
reforms, this article reaches the novel conclusion that the federal thrift
charter is no longer necessary to provide a source of residential lending
or to stabilize the market. Further, it states that under the current
regulatory scheme, the charter is of little value to the banks, states, or
borrowers.
Part I of this article analyzes the role of federal thrifts in the recent
economic crisis. Part II examines the history of HOLA and the impact
of the 1996 OTS regulations. Part III outlines Dodd-Frank’s changes to
HOLA, preemption, and the financial regulatory structure. Part IV
discusses the benefits of eliminating the federal thrift charter. In sum, if
federal thrifts add nothing to the market, do not fulfill the original
intentions of Congress, and serve only to complicate the regulatory
landscape, there is little reason to maintain their charters.
I. THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL THRIFT IN THE COLLAPSE OF THE
HOUSING MARKET
In the fall of 2011 my client, a real estate investor, found himself
litigating a title dispute in federal court with a federal savings and loan
association. He had purchased property at a homeowners’ association
foreclosure sale but had not been aware of the lender’s pending
foreclosure due to issues with the title record. As an investor, he had
experience handling title cases pro se in state court and typically could
resolve the issues within a few months. However, this property was
different. The loan originated with and was serviced by a federal thrift,
so the lender was able to remove the case to federal court based on
federal question jurisdiction arising out of field preemption under
HOLA. Eventually, the case was remanded to state court on the grounds
that the federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.16 The suit was
16. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), a plaintiff must make a motion to remand a
case on the basis of a defect in the removal procedure within thirty days after the filing
of the notice of removal under § 1446(a). However, if at any time the court finds a lack
of subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2006).
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not preempted by HOLA since the underlying mortgage was not at
issue; therefore, the case lacked a federal question. Following remand,
my client was able to rely on state consumer protection and property
laws. A typical homeowner—lacking the requisite legal knowledge—
would not have been so fortunate.
HOLA has been used to preempt state laws at every stage of the
lending process, from the rules governing the initiation of the loan, to
the terms of the note, to disputes between lenders and homeowners.
This preemption has contributed to losses felt not only by the
homeowners but also their neighbors, cities, and states. When a home
enters foreclosure, all parties suffer. Lenders lose between 20 and 60
cents on the dollar for each foreclosure.17 Vacant foreclosed homes are
vulnerable to crime, create direct costs and losses to state and local
government agencies, and reduce property values and home equity in
the surrounding areas.18 Unfortunately, federal institutions contributed
to these losses instead of preventing them.
The last two decades of deregulation, including a 1996 OTS
regulation declaring field preemption, has resulted in catastrophic
change to the residential lending landscape.19 In A Failure of
Capitalism, Judge Posner explains the cause of the financial crisis of
2008:
[A]ggressive and imaginative marketing of home mortgages . . .
[and] diminishing regulation of the banking industry . . . spurred
speculative lending, especially on residential real estate, which is
bought mainly with debt. As in 1929, the eventual bursting of the
bubble endangered the solvency of banks and other financial
20
institutions.

Federal favoritism did not prevent the crisis, nor did it minimize the
involvement of federal thrifts in the collapse. Decades of deregulation
A remand based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction may occur at any time and can be
made by any party, including the judge acting sua sponte. Id. § 1447.
17. NEIGHBORWORKS AMERICA, FORECLOSURE STATISTICS 2, available at http://
www.fdic.gov/about/comein/files/foreclosure_statistics.pdf.
18. G. THOMAS KINGSLEY, ROBIN SMITH & DAVID PRICE, THE URBAN INSTITUTE,
THE IMPACTS OF FORECLOSURES ON FAMILIES AND COMMUNITIES15–21(2009),
available at http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=411909.
19. For a discussion of the changes to the lending market, see infra Part II.
20. RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND THE
DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION 13 (2009).
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aimed at keeping federal thrifts solvent allowed the institutions to
engage in higher risk practices without adequate oversight from the
OTS.21
Federally-chartered financial institutions played a significant role in
the recent fiscal crisis. National banks funded 21 of the 25 largest
subprime lenders.22 In addition, federally-regulated banks and thrifts
saw higher default rates in their mortgages than state regulated banks
and thrifts.23 Federal institutions were involved in predatory lending
through loan origination as well as the purchase of predatory loans or
securities backed by predatory loans.24 Lenders regulated by the OTS
were “among the worst offenders.”25 To prevent a complete financial
meltdown, the federal government was required to bail out institutions
such as Washington Mutual, the largest institution at the time holding a
thrift charter.26
Preemption of state consumer protection laws has weakened
protection of homeowners at the state level.27 Field preemption allowed
federal savings and loans to avoid state regulation; at the same time it
thwarted states’ attempts at lessening the impact of predatory lending
and other actions by thrifts that led to the mortgage crisis.28 State
government authorities have testified that one of the biggest obstacles to
effective regulations of unfair and subprime lending came from the
federal government.29 Prentiss Cox, who formerly held the positions of

21.
22.

See infra notes 22–30.
CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 3, at 13 (citing testimony of Illinois
Attorney General Lisa Madigan).
23. Id.
24. See Julian Patterson Forrester, Still Mortgaging the American Dream:
Predatory Lending, Preemption and Federally Supported Lenders, 74 U. CIN. L. REV.
1303, 1349 (2006).
25. Eggert, supra note 3, at 173.
26. See All Things Considered: Washington Mutual Collapses (NPR radio
broadcast Sept. 26, 2008). On September 25, 2008, the OTS seized Washington Mutual
Bank and placed it into receivership of the FDIC. Washington Mutual was sold to JP
Morgan Chase. Washington Mutual accounted for approximately 20% of the assets
overseen by the OTS and 12% of the OTS budget. See OTS Fact Sheet on Washington
Mutual Bank (Sept. 25, 2008), http://files.ots.treas.gov/730021.pdf.
27. See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 79–80 (2008).
28. Eggert, supra note 3, at 173; Robert Berner & Brian Grow, They Warned Us:
The Watchdogs Who Saw the Subprime Disaster Coming-And How They Were
Thwarted by the Banks and Washington, BUSINESS WEEK, Oct. 20, 2008, at 36, 41.
29. CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 3, at 13.
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Minnesota Assistant Attorney General and Manager of the Consumer
Enforcement Division, criticized the federal government stating: “Not
only were they negligent, they were aggressive players attempting to
stop any enforcement action[s] . . . . Those guys should have been on
our side.”30 When considering the original purpose of HOLA, the
impact of such action is especially troubling.
Under the U.S. system of government, state laws may go into effect
when passed, without approval by the federal government. Although
“the laws of the United States [are] the Supreme Law of the Land,” state
law yields to federal law only when it conflicts with the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the U.S.31 The federal government does not have
general oversight of the states and cannot overturn a law for policy
reasons. A determination of any relevant conflict is made by the
judiciary, which also has the power to review the constitutionality of
federal and state legislative action.32 Courts utilize the preemption
doctrine to determine when the Supremacy Clause requires federal law
to displace state law. Generally, there is a presumption against
preemption, but courts abandon the presumption when the area of law
has “a history of significant federal presence.”33 Courts consider both
the historic role of state laws and the role of the states when determining
congressional intent to preempt.34
The national banking system has been controversial since its
inception.35 Federal financial institutions have existed since very early
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. (quoting Prentiss Cox).
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause).
See U.S. CONST. art. III; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000).
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (“[T]he purpose of Congress
is the ultimate touchstone in every preemption case.”).
35. The debate is first addressed by the Supreme Court in McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). In 1816, Congress passed a statute creating a national
bank to perform usual banking functions and serve as a depository for federal
government funds. Supporters of the bank argued that it was necessary to help facilitate
economic expansion and provide a source of funds for the government during wartime.
Id. at 330. Opponents, such as Thomas Jefferson, argued that the states maintained the
power to control banking under the Tenth Amendment and that the Commerce Clause
did not provide Congress with the power to create a national bank. 5 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 284–89 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1904). In upholding the actions of
Congress, the Court asserted the superiority of federal law above states’ rights,
declaring: “[T]he states have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede,
burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by
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in American history, but states have always had a hand in the regulation
of the day-to-day activities of banks.36 In fact, the rules governing
national banks chartered pursuant to the National Bank Act (“NBA”)
only preempt state law when state regulation prevents an institution
from engaging in an activity authorized by this act.37 For example,
national banks are subjected to state contract, property, licensing,
corporations, and insurance laws.38
Federal thrifts have been given the benefit of field preemption since
inception; however, this policy is an anomaly in banking regulation.
Field preemption is usually not detrimental to plaintiffs, but this has not
been the case with federal thrifts. Because of the way the OTS was
funded, the banks, and not the citizens, were the customers of the federal
regulators. The OTS was funded largely through assessments from the
institutions it regulated, so the more thrift charters, the greater the
revenue.39 The OTS was incentivized to lure banks into the system.
Thus, there was little regulation following the clear and more expansive
declaration of field preemption. States’ continued attempts to protect
consumers with reforms were thwarted by OTS efforts to preempt state

Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the general government.”
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 336. See also Daniel A. Farber, The Story of McCulloch:
Banking on National Power, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 33, 35 (Michael C. Dorf
ed., 2004).
36. See Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 557 U.S. 519, 534 (2009) (“States . . .
have always enforced their general laws against national banks—–and have enforced
their banking-related laws against national banks for at least 85 years . . . .”).
37. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (In Rice, the
state of Illinois sued several grain warehousemen for violating the Illinois Grain
Warehouse Act. The warehousemen sued in federal court, arguing that state law was
preempted by the U.S. Warehouse Act and that the federal law should be construed to
mean that Illinois may not regulate subjects in any related area, even though the scope
of federal regulation is not as broad as the regulatory scheme of the state. The court
held that when Congress legislates in a field which the States have traditionally
occupied, the Court begins its analysis with the assumption that the police powers of the
states were not superseded by the federal law unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress); Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992); see
also infra Part III.C.
38. See 12 C.F.R. § 34.4 (2012) (stating that state laws regarding contracts, torts,
criminal law, debt collection, etc. apply to federally-charted banks “to the extent [such
laws are] consistent with the decision of the Supreme Court in Barnett Bank of Marion
County, N.A. v. Nelson, Florida Insurance Commissioner, et al., 517 U.S. 25 (1996)”).
39. CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 3, at 54.
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laws and shield the banks from regulation.40 As a result, institutions
engaged in charter shopping, often opting for the least rigorous
regulations within the federal regime.
Even in the face of preemption, OTS and OCC actions contradict
the general principles that the federal government cannot overrule a state
law solely due to policy reasons and may only challenge laws through
judicial review.41 Despite having a less restrictive preemption standard,
the OCC was not an innocent actor in the financial crisis.42 The OCC
comptrollers used their authority to admonish and threaten the states as
well as block state efforts to regulate federal entities, encouraging them
to focus on state-chartered institutions and non-banking institutions
instead.43 Both the OCC and OTS issued regulations that infringed on
state rights, arguing policy under the guise of preemption.44 In fact, the
predatory lending laws advanced by the states did not conflict with
federal laws, as there were no comparable federal laws in existence.45
Unfortunately, homeowners with loans involving a federal thrift
executed before July 21, 2011 are subject to field preemption and the
OTS regulations put in place before Dodd-Frank.46 These homeowners
are still left without a remedy due to federal interference in the markets.
Dodd-Frank seeks to return to the states some of their previous
power to regulate financial institutions. This effort does not address the
problems that federal thrifts have caused to the market as a whole, nor
does it address the efficacy of the institutions. While analyzing the
financial crisis in his book, Judge Posner states, “[t]he costs of the
present depression may include a swing to excessive regulation [and] a
politically as well as economically unhealthy dependence of business on
government largesse . . . .”47 The federal thrift is an example of this
phenomenon. The 1980s saw a period of deregulation and relaxed
restrictions on savings and loans for the purpose of increasing the
stability and profits of federal thrifts; this era resulted in the collapse of
40. See McCoy et al., supra note 10, at 1353; see also CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT,
supra note 3, at 13.
41. See supra notes 29–34 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship
between state and federal government).
42. See CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 3, at 13.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Dodd-Frank Act § 1044(a); see infra Part III.C.
47. POSNER, supra note 20, at 114–15.
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several institutions.48 The OTS was created, HOLA was amended, and
the oversight of thrifts changed in order to promote stability.49 DoddFrank is the second major attempt to reform federal thrifts, aiming to
keep them afloat while minimizing the impact of failure. Despite facing
yet another crisis involving federal savings and loans,50 Congress did not
address in the first instance whether federal thrifts are necessary to
stimulate residential lending during their discussions on the Dodd-Frank
Act.
Thus, despite the failures of federal regulations and the collapse of
federal thrifts, the threat of complex and protracted litigation is still a
federal savings and loan’s greatest weapon against economically
distressed homeowners.
Although the Dodd-Frank Act changes
preemption for thrifts to the standard governing banks pursuant to the
NBA, plaintiffs will still face the prospect of litigation in federal court
while these courts interpret the new standards.51 In addition, if the OCC
continues its regulatory behavior, eliminating the OTS will not give
states the power they need to protect homeowners and properly regulate
federal thrifts.
II. FEDERAL PREEMPTION UNDER HOLA
Federal legislation preempts state law in three circumstances: (1)
where Congress expresses a clear intent to preempt state law; (2) when
federal law occupies the field; or (3) where a clear conflict exists
between federal law and state law.52 A federal defense such as
48.
49.

See infra Part II.A. (discussing the savings and loan crisis).
Id.; see also Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act
(FIRREA) § 101, 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (2006).
50. Id.
51. See infra Part III for a detailed discussion of the Dodd-Frank changes to the
residential lending industry.
52. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525–26 (1977); Ray v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157–58 (1978); Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v.
Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 30–31 (1996); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009) (quoting
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)) (“[T]he purpose of Congress is the
ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.”). Under field preemption, a state law is
preempted “if federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.”
Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under
conflict preemption, a conflict exists when a state regulation makes compliance with the
federal law a “physical impossibility,” or where the state law creates “an obstacle to the
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preemption is not enough to grant removal to a federal forum.53
However, if there is field preemption of an area of law, the claim
actually arises under federal law for purposes of removal.54 Prior to
Dodd-Frank, the OTS relied on HOLA to permit the field preemption of
state laws against federal thrifts, their subsidiaries, and independent
agents.55 Although the OTS carved out exceptions for property, fraud,
and contract claims, by preempting laws that substantially impact
mortgage lending and servicing, it effectively took control of areas
traditionally controlled by the states without providing a comparable
form of relief.56
The sections below outline the history of HOLA preemption and
federal thrifts, as well as the 1996 OTS regulations. They also describe
how the courts have interpreted the OTS field preemption mandate.
A. HISTORY OF HOLA AND THE FEDERAL THRIFT
The residential lending market has changed greatly during the last
century.57 Prior to the development of federal institutions that promoted
lending, residential mortgages were uncommon. HOLA, “a product of
the Great Depression of the 1930’s, was intended ‘to provide emergency
relief with respect to home mortgage indebtedness at a time when as

accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Florida
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963).
53. Tennessee v. Union & Planters’ Bank, 152 U.S. 454, 461–63 (1894).
54. Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8 (2003).
55. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 6–8 (2007) (holding that a
national bank’s mortgage business, even when conducted by a subsidiary of that bank
rather than the bank itself, cannot be subject to state mortgage lending requirements
such as registration, inspection and enforcement regimes); SPGGC, LLC v. Ayotte, 488
F.3d 525, 532 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that when a thrift acts through an independent
agent, activities of the agent are protected); Chief Counsel of the Office of Thrift
Supervision (OTS), P-2003-1, Preemption of Georgia Fair Lending Act (Jan. 21, 2003),
http:// www.ots.treas.gov/docs/5/56301.pdf. See also State Farm Bank, FSB v. Reardon,
539 F.3d 336, 340–41 (6th Cir. 2008).
56. See 12 C.F.R. § 560 (2012).
57. In 1900, less than half of Americans owned their own home. Following a
slight uptick in the 1920s, the Great Depression drove the rate down to 44 percent.
After the housing reforms of the New Deal Era, the rate rose to 61.9% by 1960, and
continued to slowly rise to a rate of 66.2% in 2000. See Historical Census of Housing
Tables, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/
census/historic/owner.html (last updated Oct. 31, 2011).
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many as half of all home loans in the country were in default.”58 The
purpose of HOLA was to create additional sources of mortgage
financing in areas where no existing home-loan institutions were
available.59 HOLA was intended to provide emergency relief in
response to inadequacies in the state systems.60 HOLA did serve its
purpose for several decades under the careful regulation of federal
government agencies, and homeownership grew due to an abundance of
financing sources.61
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board (“FHLBB”) was the primary
regulator of federal savings associations until 1989, when the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (“FIRREA”)
amended HOLA and the OTS took over the FHLBB’s supervisory
responsibilities and rulemaking powers.62 Up until the financial
difficulties of the 1970s, federal thrifts served their purpose and
operated to increase residential lending.63 The Federal Reserve gave
savings and loan associations favorable treatment, allowing them to pay
higher interest rates on deposits than commercial banks.64 Eventually,
non-bank lenders began to enter the residential lending market. These
entities offered more advantageous interest rates, alternative loan
arrangements, and other perks prohibited or restricted by federal
regulations.65 Due to inflation, competition from other institutions, and

58. Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 159 (1982)
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 73-210, at 1 (1933) (Conf. Rep.)); see also In re Ocwen Loan
Servicing, LLC Mortg. Servicing Litig., 491 F.3d 638, 641–42 (7th Cir. 2007).
59. See 77 CONG. REC. 2480, 2486 (1933); De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 159–60
(“[HOLA was passed in 1933] and provided for the creation of a system of federal
savings and loan associations, which would be regulated by the Board so as to ensure
their vitality as permanent associations to promote the thrift of the people in a
cooperative manner, to finance their homes and the homes of their neighbors.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
60. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 159–60; see also 77 CONG. REC. 2480, 2486.
61. See Historical Census of Housing Tables, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Oct. 31,
2011), http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/census/historic/owner.html.
62. FIRREA § 101, 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (2006).
63. See Timothy Curry & Lynn Shibut, The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis:
Truth and Consequences, FDIC BANKING REV., Dec. 2000, at 26, available at
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/2000dec/.
64. See Regulation Q, 12 C.F.R. 217 (2010) (Regulation Q no longer exists
independently and has now been incorporated into Regulation D).
65. See generally Curry & Shibut, supra note 63, at 27.
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the restrictions placed on federal thrifts, savings and loans struggled to
make profits and compete in the market.66
In an attempt to strengthen thrifts, the legislature enacted several
acts. In 1980, the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act67 authorized thrifts to issue credit cards and make consumer
and commercial real estate loans, each of up to 20% of assets,
respectively.68 Other legislation reduced net worth requirements,
expanded the activities of federal thrifts, and enacted tax incentives. For
instance, the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 198269
allowed thrifts to offer adjustable rate mortgages, interest only notes,
and balloon notes.70 For the first time, efforts were made to allow
federal savings and loans to engage in more than just residential lending
activities. Thrifts were allowed to make higher risk non-residential
loans in the interest of receiving greater reward.
Unfortunately, these expansions simply shifted the risk from the
thrifts to the homeowners.71 In addition to a reduction in legislative
control, oversight by the FHLBB was increasingly lax over the years,
due in part to a reduction in its staff.72 Favorable regulations caused
banks to obtain federal charters at higher rates than before.73 These
efforts did not yield the intended result, and by the mid-1980s the
federal savings and loan crisis erupted.74 Customers of thrifts demanded
higher rates of return on deposits and thrifts complied out of fear of
losing their market share. Despite this arrangement, the interest that
thrifts earned from mortgages and other long-term loans did not generate
adequate revenue to match their costs.75 Federal thrifts began to fail
nationwide, resulting in record losses estimated at a total of $12.1 billion
in 1988.76 In total, almost 3,000 banks and federal savings and loans
66.
67.

Id.
Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C. & 15 U.S.C.).
68. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-51(2).
69. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
the U.S.C.).
70. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 3801-3805 (1982).
71. CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 3, at 35–36.
72. Curry & Shibut, supra note 63.
73. Id. at 27.
74. Id.
75. CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 3, at 34.
76. See Nathaniel C. Nash, Savings Loss Put at $2.3 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22,
1989 at D1; see also Curry & Shibut supra note 63, at 27–28.
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failed.77 Between July 1990 and February 1992, before the crisis had
even ended, national home values had declined by 2.5%.78 The total
cost of the crisis is estimated to range between $100 and $160 billion.79
In response to this crisis that began in the late 1980s, Congress
passed FIRREA in 1989, which restructured savings and loans by
dissolving the FHLBB and replacing it with the OTS.80 FIRREA then
amended HOLA to give the OTS the responsibility of promulgating
uniform accounting and disclosure regulations.81 As part of the bailout
plan for federal thrifts, FIRREA also shifted deposit insurance functions
to the FDIC.82 FIRREA also imposed stricter net worth requirements
and greater general oversight.83
In addition to the changes in thrift structure, the OTS was also
empowered to preempt conflicting state law through regulations
pursuant to HOLA and FIRREA.84 Under HOLA, OTS had “authority
[that] is preemptive of any state law purporting to address the subject of
the operations of a Federal savings association.”85 Regulators believed
that preemption would provide a uniform set of regulations and ensure
the stability of federal thrifts “by efficiently delivering low-cost credit to
the public free from undue regulatory duplication and burden.”86
Notably, HOLA’s content does not contain any explicit
congressional intent of field preemption, and no court has specifically
addressed whether OTS field preemption is appropriate.87 However,
despite Congress’ silence, laws adopted by the FHLBB as well as case
law interpreting such regulations have held that HOLA does in fact

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

See Curry & Shibut supra note 63, at 27–28.
CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 3, at 36.
Curry & Shibut, supra note 63, at 29.
FIRREA §§ 301, 304, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1462a, 1468 (2006).
FIRREA § 301, 12 U.S.C. § 1463(b). FIRREA amendments also require all
savings associations to achieve and maintain adequate capital, with standards no less
stringent than those applicable to national banks. HOLA § 5(t)(1)(c).
82. Previously, deposits were insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation (FSLIC), which insured savings and loan accounts up to $100,000.

83.
84.

12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(c)(2)(a).

In re Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC Mortg. Servicing Litig., 491 F.3d 638, 642
(7th Cir. 2007).
85. 12 C.F.R. § 545.2 (2012).
86. 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a) (2012).
87. See JULIE L. WILLIAMS, SAVINGS INSTITUTIONS: MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS AND
CONVERSIONS § 17.01, at 17-4.
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occupy the field.88 Long before OTS regulations declared field
occupation in 1996, one district court concluded that “not only does the
Act of Congress which authorizes the creation, operation and
supervision of federal savings and loan associations . . . embrace the
entire field, but the comprehensive rules and regulations adopted by the
Board clearly meet the test of covering the subject matter of the
statute.”89 Over the years, Congress did not correct this assumption,
even following the near collapse of the institutions in the 1980s. In
Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan Association v. De La Cuesta,90 the
Supreme Court states, “it would have been difficult for Congress to give
. . . a broader mandate . . . . [HOLA governs] the powers and operations
of every federal savings and loan association from its cradle to its
corporate grave.”91 Until Dodd-Frank eliminated the OTS, it had
plenary authority under HOLA to issue regulations governing federal
savings and loans.92 As a result, federal thrifts were given a level of
preemption greater than that afforded to national banks.
In connection to loans originating before Dodd-Frank,93 OTS
regulation claims that it “occupies the entire field of lending regulation
for federal savings associations.”94 The OTS regulations preempted
state laws “affecting the operations of federal savings associations . . . to
enable federal savings associations to conduct their operations in
accordance with the best practices of thrift institutions.”95 Specifically,
the regulations preempt state laws imposing requirements regarding
licensing, credit terms, loan fees, disclosure requirements, origination,
and interest rates; on the other hand they do not preempt state laws that
“only incidentally affect the lending operations of Federal savings
associations.”96 In theory, the federal system of borrower-protection

88. People v. Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 98 F. Supp. 311, 316 (S.D. Cal.
1951).
89. Id. at 318.
90. 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
91. Id. at 145 (quoting Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 98 F. Supp. at 316).
92. See FRREA, Pub. L. No. § 301, 103 Stat. 280-282 (repealed 2010); Sec. Sav. &
Loan v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 960 F.2d 1318, 1321 n.8 (5th Cir. 1992).
93. Dodd-Frank overturns the field preemption standard in the OTS regulation, and
declares that courts must make a case-by-case determination as to whether a state’s
substantive law should be preempted. See Dodd-Frank Act § 1044(a).
94. 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a) (2012).
95. Id.
96. Id. § 560.2(b)–(c).
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statues would be used to protect homeowners.97 The OTS believed
preemption was necessary to prevent another savings and loan crisis.
Ultimately, field preemption resulted in an improper federal intrusion on
states’ rights and contributed to the financial collapse.98
B. THE 1996 OTS REGULATIONS
With the authority granted by FIRREA, the OTS promulgated a
regulation in 1996 asserting the rights of federal savings and loan
associations to “extend credit as authorized under federal law . . .
without regard to state laws purporting to regulate or otherwise affect
their credit activities.”99 Specifically, 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a) provides:
Occupation of field. Pursuant to sections 4(a) and 5(a) of the
HOLA, 12 U.S.C. 1463(a), 1464(a), OTS is authorized to
promulgate regulations that preempt state laws affecting the
operations of federal savings associations when deemed appropriate
to facilitate the safe and sound operation of federal savings
associations, to enable federal savings associations to conduct their
operations in accordance with the best practices of thrift institutions
in the United States, or to further other purposes of the HOLA. To
enhance safety and soundness and to enable federal savings
associations to conduct their operations in accordance with best
practices (by efficiently delivering low-cost credit to the public free
from undue regulatory duplication and burden), OTS hereby
occupies the entire field of lending regulation for federal savings
associations. OTS intends to give federal savings association’s
maximum flexibility to exercise their lending powers in accordance
with a uniform federal scheme of regulation. Accordingly, federal
savings associations may extend credit as authorized under federal
law, including this part, without regard to state laws purporting to
regulate or otherwise affect their credit activities, except to the
extent provided in paragraph (c) of this section or § 560.110 of this
100
part . . . .

97. Interview by Dixie Noonan, Senior Counsel, FCIC, of Alan Greenspan, former
Chairman, Federal Reserve, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 31, 2010), available at
http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-docs/2010-03-31%20FCIC%
20memo%20of%20staff%20interview%20with%20Alan%20Greenspan%20Interview,
%20Federal%20Reserve%20Board.pdf.
98. See supra Part I for an analysis of federal thrift involvement in the financial
crisis.
99. 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a).
100. Id.
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Subsection 560.2(a) leaves no room for conflicting state laws.101
The regulation codifies the long-standing presumption that HOLA
occupies the field.102
Subsection 560.2(b) goes on to provide a non-exhaustive list of
examples of state laws that are expressly preempted, stating, in relevant
part:
Except as provided in § 560.110 of this part, the types of state laws
preempted by paragraph (a) of this section include, without
limitation, state laws purporting to impose requirements regarding
processing, origination, servicing, sale or purchase of, or investment
103
or participation in, mortgages.

The list of activities in 560.2(b) is similar to lists found in the
regulations of other institutions.104 However, the language in 560.2(b) is
stronger. Other regulations preempt state laws that “obstruct” or
“impair” the activities of federal institutions, while 560.2(b) preempts
actions that impose any requirement without regard to whether a state
regulation conflicts with or compliments federal law.
The savings clause found in 560.2(c) has been the source of most of
the litigation related to HOLA. It should be used to allow states to
maintain control of traditional areas of law. However, due to its
wording, this provision has been utilized to deny homeowners legal
remedies. Subsection 560.2(c) provides:
State laws of the following types are not preempted to the extent that
they only incidentally affect the lending operations of Federal
savings associations or are otherwise consistent with the purposes of
paragraph (a) of this section:
(1) Contract and commercial law;
(2) Real property law;
(3) Homestead laws specified in 12 U.S.C. 1462a(f);
(4) Tort law;
(5) Criminal law; and
(6) Any other law that OTS, upon review, finds:
(i) Furthers a vital state interest; and
(ii) Either has only an incidental effect on
lending operations or is not otherwise contrary to

101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 161–62 (1982).
12 C.F.R. § 560.2(b)(10).
See, e.g., id. § 34.4.
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the purposes expressed in paragraph (a) of this
105
section.

Following the guidance of the OTS, the Ninth Circuit provided a
procedure for determining whether regulations preempt a state law in
Silvas v. E*TRADE Mortgage Corp.106:
The first step will be to determine whether the type of law in
question is listed in paragraph (b). If so, the analysis will end there;
the law is preempted. If the law is not covered by paragraph (b), the
next question is whether the law affects lending. If it does, then, in
accordance with paragraph (a), the presumption arises that the law is
preempted. This presumption can be reversed only if the law can
clearly be shown to fit within the confines of paragraph (c). For
these purpose paragraph (c) is intended to be interpreted narrowly.
107
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of preemption.

The OTS failed to provide a bright line test for deciding preemption
issues. In a 1996 OTS Opinion Letter, the Chief Counsel of the OTS
concluded that an Indiana statute prohibiting deceptive trade practices in
commerce was exempt pursuant to paragraph (c).108 The law did not
“affect lending” because its purpose was to regulate practices of all
businesses within the state, not to impose policy on federal thrifts
specifically.109 The position of the OTS evolved over time, and in so
doing found that more state laws had been preempted. In 2003, the OTS
issued letters announcing preemption of predatory lending statutes in
several states including Georgia, New York, New Jersey, and New
Mexico.110 Although the predatory lending statutes sought to prohibit
105.
106.
107.

Id. § 560.2(c).
514 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1005 (quoting Lending and Investment, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,951, 50,966–67
(Sept. 30, 1996) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 560.2)).
108. Chief Counsel of the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), P-96-14, Preemption
of State Laws Applicable to Credit Card Transactions, 6 (Dec. 24, 1996),
http://www.occ.gov/static/news-issuances/ots/legal-opinions/ots-lo-12-24-1996.pdf.
109. Id. (“[B]ecause federal thrifts are presumed to interact with their borrowers in a
truthful manner, Indiana’s general prohibition on deception should have no measurable
impact on their lending operations.”).
110. See Chief Counsel of the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), P-2003-1,
Preemption of Georgia Fair Lending Act (Jan. 21, 2003), www.occ.gov/static/newsissuances/ots/legal-opinions/ots-lo-01-21-2003.pdf.; Chief Counsel of the Office of
Thrift Supervision (OTS), P-2003-2, Preemption of New York Predatory Lending Law
(Jan. 30, 2003), www.occ.gov/static/news-issuances/ots/legal-opinions/ots-lo-01-302003.pdf; Chief Counsel of the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), P-2003-5,
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egregious behavior that was traditionally within state domain, the OTS
held that the statutes imposed requirements on lending as outlined in
paragraph (b).111
OTS regulations preempted areas traditionally under state control
such as real property, fraud, and contract law112 if they imposed
requirements on lenders or substantially impacted mortgage lending and
servicing. In the Letters Preempting Predatory Lending Laws, the OTS
used preemption to obstruct state attempts to slow the impact of the
crisis.113 Once the OTS occupied the field, the agency became the only
source of protection from abusive practices by federal lenders. By
carving out exceptions for specific types of law but preempting all
activity that interfered with lending, the OTS regulation resulted in
confusion and allowed banks to rely on an exception to escape
regulation.114
C. ANALYSIS OF HOLA PREEMPTION IN THE COURTS
Federal circuits have used varying methods to interpret the 1996
HOLA Regulations, with the Seventh Circuit finding preemption only in
limited circumstances and the Eighth and Ninth Circuits taking a
broader approach.115 Seventh Circuit courts have held that state
common-law claims are not preempted, and that preemption is not
Preemption of New Jersey Predatory Lending Act (July 22, 2003),
www.occ.gov/static/news-issuances/ots/legal-opinions/ots-lo-07-22-2003.pdf;
Chief
Counsel of the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), P-2003-6, Preemption of New
Mexico Home Loan Protection Act (Sept. 2, 2003), www.occ.gov/static/newsissuances/ots/legal-opinions/ots-lo-09-02-2003.pdf [hereinafter collectively “OTS
Letters Preempting Predatory Lending Laws”].
111. See OTS Letters Preempting Predatory Lending Laws, supra note 110.
112. See, e.g., Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979) (finding that
federal patent law does not prevent enforcement of a contract for payment of royalty
fees when the parties contemplate denial of the patent in the contract); Oregon ex rel.
State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977) (finding that a
majority of law related to property exists in the domain of the states).
113. OTS Letters Preempting Predatory Lending Laws, supra note 110.
114. See, e.g., CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 3, at 14–16.
115. See, e.g., Casey v. FDIC, 583 F.3d 586 (8th Cir. 2009) (finding claims under
Missouri Merchandising Practices Act preempted by HOLA); Silvas v. E*Trade Mortg.
Corp., 514 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding claims under California Unfair
Competition Law preempted by HOLA); In re Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC Mortg.
Servicing Litig., 491 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding common law claims generally
not preempted).
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required when it leaves a homeowner with no adequate remedy.116 The
Eighth and Ninth Circuits have followed the OTS regulations exactly,
using an “as applied” analysis to preempt all activity that interferes with
lending in any way without consideration of the outcome.117 Other
Circuits have either chosen to clearly follow the Seventh, Eighth or
Ninth Circuits or approach preemption on a case-by-case basis, creating
inconsistent results.118
Following Judge Posner’s approach from In re Ocwen Loan
Servicing, LLC Mortgage Servicing Litigation, courts such as the
Seventh Circuit have held that certain state law claims against a federal
savings and loan association compliment rather than conflict with
HOLA.119 The courts have balanced the OTS’s authority over federal
banks with the ability of homeowners to recover under HOLA’s
statutory structure.120 When a plaintiff’s claim is based on a defendant’s
conduct under laws that do not regulate lending activity, the claims are
not preempted.121 Under Judge Posner’s approach the court does not
find preemption even if a law may be applied to impact lending in some
scenarios, as long as it does not impose requirements on a federal thrift
in the case at hand.122 Claims based on property law have long been
recognized by the Supreme Court as a matter of special concern to
states; the Seventh Circuit thus considers them to be specifically
reserved for the states by §560.2(c).123 Therefore, to determine whether
a property claim is preempted, the Seventh Circuit considers the
function and specific nature of each state law claim to determine
whether it is an attempt at regulation preempted by HOLA.124

116.
117.
118.
119.

See, e.g., Ocwen, 491 F.3d 638.
See Casey, 583 F.3d 586; Silvas, 514 F.3d 1001.
See supra notes 135–177 and accompanying text.
Ocwen, 491 F.3d at 643–44; see also Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673
F.3d 547, 578 (7th Cir. 2012).
120. Ocwen, 491 F.3d 638 at 644; see also Jones v. Home Loan Inv., F.S.B., 718 F.
Supp. 2d 728, 735 (S.D. W. Va. 2010).
121. See Ocwen, 491 F.3d at 643–44.
122. Id.
123. See Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982); Butner v.
United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55–56 (1979) (“Property interests are created and defined
by state law.”).
124. See Ocwen, 491 F.3d at 643; see also Dixon v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 798 F.
Supp. 2d 336, 356 (D. Mass. 2011) (“The question is one of function, not theory: will
enforcement of the cause of action interfere with or contravene lending, the regulation
of which Congress has committed exclusively to a federal agency?”).
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The Seventh Circuit approach to HOLA preemption is reflective of
judicial attempts to provide a remedy for homeowners. In Ocwen, the
lender sought to dismiss the homeowner’s claims based on fraud and
breach of contract. In deciding to deny the lender’s motion to dismiss,
Judge Posner explains “[t]he line between subsections (b) and (c) is both
intuitive and reasonably clear.”125 The OTS “has exclusive authority to
regulate the savings and loan industry in the sense of fixing fees
(including penalties), setting licensing requirements, prescribing certain
terms in mortgages, establishing requirements for disclosure of credit
information to customers, and setting standards for processing and
servicing of mortgages.”126 However, the “assertion of plenary authority
does not deprive persons harmed by the wrongful acts of savings and
loan associations of their basic state common-law type remedies.”127
The court balanced the OTS’s authority over federal banks with the
ability of consumers to recover in federal courts under federal or state
law.128
The Seventh Circuit provides examples of scenarios in which an as
applied analysis would yield an unjust result:
Suppose [a savings and loan association] signs a mortgage
agreement with a homeowner that specifies an annual interest rate of
6 percent and a year later bills the homeowner at a rate of 10 percent
and when the homeowner refuses to pay institutes foreclosure
proceedings. It would be surprising for a federal regulation to forbid
the homeowner’s state to give the homeowner a defense based on the
mortgagee’s breach of contract. Or if the mortgagee fraudulently
represents to the mortgagor that it will forgive a default, and then
forecloses, it would be surprising for a federal regulation to bar a suit
for fraud. Some federal laws do create such bars, notably ERISA,
but this is recognized as exceptional. Enforcement of state law in
either of the mortgage-servicing examples above would complement
129
rather than substitute for the federal regulatory scheme.

Instead of a blanket preemption of all laws, the Seventh Circuit
divides claims into those that fall onto the regulatory side of the ledger,

125.
126.
127.
128.

Ocwen, 491 F.3d at 643.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see also Jones v. Home Loan Inv., F.S.B., 718 F. Supp. 2d 728, 734 (S.D.
W. Va. 2010).
129. Ocwen, 491 F.3d at 643–44 (internal citations omitted).

2013]

HOLA PREEMPTION

587

and those that fall onto the common law side.130 State consumer finance
laws, like the ones preempted by the OTS in the Letters Preempting
Predatory Lending Laws, were aimed at curbing the activities
established in the examples above.131
Following the Seventh Circuit’s approach, a court would not
preempt a wrongful foreclosure or consumer protection law aimed at
subprime lending if such law merely applies a common law equally to
all lenders, even if it addresses loan servicing and processing. To
determine preemption the court must look to the nature of the claim,
including the actions alleged in the complaint. The OTS lacks the
authority to provide a remedy to those injured by the wrongful acts of
federal savings and loan associations.132 Therefore, if HOLA preempts
all causes of action related to the mortgage, even those for which it has
not provided remedies, then federal savings associations could “use
preemption as a shield to avoid adherence” to the commitments that they
make to their customers.133 Since neither federal law nor the OTS has
the means to redress plaintiffs harmed by federal savings and loan
associations’ breaches of contract, fraud, or tortious acts, Ocwen holds
that the regulations cannot be read to deprive persons of basic common
law remedies, even those that may interfere with loan servicing. 134 The
Seventh Circuit and courts following its approach apply an analysis
similar to that used in cases under the NBA.135
Courts following the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have held that any
“state law that either on its face or as applied imposes requirements
regarding the examples listed in § 560.2(b) is preempted.”136 The Ninth
Circuit explains in Silvas that the OTS has laid out a system of
regulation “so pervasive as to leave no room for state regulatory
control.”137 Courts following this approach use an applied analysis
where a state law that is not preempted on its face may be preempted if
it fits within Section 560.2(b) as applied. Claims based on a loan

130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 644.
See OTS Letters Preempting Predatory Lending Laws, supra note 110.
See id. at 643.
Dixon v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 798 F. Supp. 2d 336, 356 (D. Mass. 2011)
(citations omitted).
134. Ocwen, 491 F.3d at 643.
135. See infra Part III.B.
136. Casey v. FDIC, 583 F.3d 586, 595 (8th Cir. 2009). See also Silvas v. E*Trade
Mortg. Corp., 514 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2008).
137. Silvas, 514 F.3d at 1003–04.
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transaction, even when rooted in common law claims, are preempted.138
This analysis preempts most state consumer protection laws, unless they
are pure common law claims.139
In Silvas, the Ninth Circuit held that claims based on the California
unfair competition law were preempted by HOLA.140 The plaintiffs
alleged that E*Trade Mortgage Corporation violated the law by
including false information on its website and in advertising, by
misrepresenting consumer legal rights in advertising and other
documents, and by charging an interest rate lock-in fee that was not
refunded when loan applicants cancelled.141 The California law applied
equally to all businesses and was not limited to just federal
institutions.142 It did not create a regime of favoritism for state
entities.143
The Ninth Circuit took a very limited approach in analyzing
Section 560.2(b). The Ninth Circuit held that the claims were
preempted by HOLA, as HOLA generally preempts state law claims
regarding advertising and disclosures.144 Additionally, HOLA preempts
state laws that purport to impose requirements on loan fees. The Court
ended its analysis because the law was the type of state law
contemplated under paragraph (b) and did not require examination under
paragraph (c).
In Casey, the Eighth Circuit reached a similar result, finding that
claims that violated the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act were
preempted by HOLA because the law purported to impose requirements
regarding loan-related fees.145 The plaintiff alleged that the lender’s
practice of charging fees for the preparation of documents by nonlawyers violated the Missouri law.146 The homeowners in Casey argued
that paragraph (b) referred to state laws that on their face impose
requirements on lenders, and because the Missouri Act was a law of

138.
139.

Davis v. World Sav. Bank, F.S.B., 806 F. Supp. 2d 159, 171 (D.D.C. 2011).
See, e.g., Sovereign Bank v. Sturgis, No. 11-10601-DPW, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 38860 (D. Mass. Mar. 22, 2012).
140. Silvas, 514 F.3d at 1006.
141. Id. at 1004.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1006.
145. Casey v. FDIC, 583 F.3d 586, 595 (8th Cir. 2009).
146. Id.

2013]

HOLA PREEMPTION

589

general application the statute was not preempted by HOLA.147 The
court disagreed, holding that because the OTS had previously used an as
applied analysis, a state law that either on its face or as applied imposes
requirements regarding the examples listed in paragraph (b) is
preempted.148 Even though the law was of general application, as it
applied to the homeowner’s claims the statute imposed requirements
regarding loan related fees.149 Under the Casey reading of the law, only
the OTS had the authority to impose restrictions on fees.
Courts using the as applied analysis have preempted many types of
general application laws. For example, any claims based on defects in
the procedure used to foreclose the property are preempted by HOLA.150
Courts taking this approach hold that while a wrongful foreclosure claim
is also a common law claim, these claims seek to bind federal thrifts to
requirements outlined in state law and therefore fall within the confines
of 560.2(b).151 This analysis is unique to federal thrifts; courts analyzing
preemption under the NBA have held that it does not preempt wrongful
foreclosure laws.152
Under the as applied analysis, HOLA has also been found to
preempt claims related to breach of an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing in lending, even though they are nothing more than
breach of contract claims.153 Additionally, when claims are based on the
deficiency of disclosures in loan documents or the structure of the loan
itself, claims are preempted by HOLA even though they may be
classified as fraud, breach of contract, or other common law causes of
action.154 Thus, courts utilizing the as applied analysis will find these
claims to be preempted even if there is no comparable federal means of

147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Hague v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 11-02366, 2012 WL 1029668, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012) (“[W]rongful foreclosure action is based on allegations
regarding note ownership, securitization, and substitution of trustee, all defects in the
foreclosure procedure used by Defendant and therefore within the ambit of HOLA
preemption.”).
151. Id.
152. See infra Part III.C (discussing preemption under the NBA).
153. Haehl v. Washington Mut. Bank, F.A., 277 F. Supp. 2d 933, 942–43 (S.D. Ind.
2003); Washington Mut. Bank v. Superior Court, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 765, 780 (Ct. App.
2002).
154. Kelley v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 642 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1054
(N.D. Cal. 2009).
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recovery, simply because they impact lending. The as applied approach
gives very little deference to the savings provision in 560.2(c).
Under either the Seventh Circuit of as-applied approach, if claims
are clearly based on common law, courts do not find preemption.155 As
one district court explains: “HOLA does not preempt a plaintiff’s claims
that are premised on fraud or promises made by defendants. ‘[S]uch
claims are not necessarily preempted, because the only ‘requirement’
they impose on federal savings banks is that they be held responsible for
the statement they make to their borrowers.’”156 When all of a plaintiff’s
claims are based on representations made by the lender and do not
involve the administration of the loan, claims are not preempted.157
Similarly, when a claim is purely based on breach of contract, there
is no preemption. If a homeowner seeks only to compel a thrift to
supply the notice that it contractually agreed to, without requiring the
lender to draft specific terms, the common law breach of contract claims
are not preempted by HOLA.
HOLA field preemption requires various types of cases to be
litigated in federal court, such as actions arising out of lending or
regulating lending. As a result of the OTS regulations, courts allowed
banks to remove cases to federal court and often found that HOLA
preempted homeowners’ attempts to recover for egregious practices by
the banks. As there were no corresponding federal claims, homeowners
were left with no remedy for the wrongs of lenders holding federal thrift
charters. Many federal courts saw the injustice in such a system and
used the exceptions in the regulations to allow cases to continue in state
155. See, e.g., Susilo v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 796 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1186 (C.D.
Cal. 2011) (“[W]hen a plaintiff’s claim is based on a defendant’s failure to fulfill the
general duty not to misrepresent material facts, . . . the claims are not preempted.”
(citing Biggins v. Wells Fargo & Co., 266 F.R.D. 399, 417 (N.D. Cal. 2009))). As long
as special requirements are not imposed on lenders, the claims are not preempted by
HOLA. Id.
156. Viets v. Wachovia Mortg., F.S.B., No. 2:11-cv-00169-GMN-RJJ, 2011 WL
6181934, at *4 (D. Nev. Dec. 12, 2011) (citing Rumbaua v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
No. 11-1998, 2011 WL 3740828, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2011)).
157. Id.; see also Becker v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 2:10-cv-02799, 2011 WL
1103439, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2011) (“[P]laintiff’s fraud claim does not arise from
a ‘state law purporting to address the subject of the operations of a federal savings
association’ and is therefore not preempted . . . .”); see also Dixon v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A., 798 F. Supp. 2d 336, 356 (D. Mass. 2011) (holding promissory estoppel claim
alleging that lender promised to enter into a loan modification if the borrowers took
certain steps was not preempted by HOLA).
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court. Other courts followed the letter of the OTS regulations, utilizing
an as applied analysis. These attempts resulted in inconsistencies,
sometimes even within the same circuit, making it impossible to predict
the outcome of a homeowner’s lawsuit against a federal thrift.
III. DODD-FRANK CHANGES TO THE RESIDENTIAL LENDING
LANDSCAPE
Federal preemption has been used as a barrier against state efforts
to address the financial meltdown.158 HOLA preemption was altered
when the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted on July 21, 2011.159 Title X of
the Dodd-Frank Act discusses the scope of federal preemption of
consumer financial laws, limiting it to conflict preemption for
institutions formerly regulated by the OTS.160 While Dodd-Frank
attempts to limit the scope of HOLA preemption and clarify which laws
apply to federal thrifts, it does not address the fact that HOLA is no
longer necessary or serving its original purposes. The discussion below
outlines the changes to the residential lending landscape made by the
Dodd-Frank Act; analyzes preemption under the NBA, which should
apply to HOLA for loans originating after July 2011; and explores the
treatment of HOLA preemption by the courts in the aftermath of DoddFrank.
A. THE DODD-FRANK CHANGES TO RESIDENTIAL LENDING
Before Dodd-Frank, no single federal institution had the legal
authority or responsibility to monitor the entire financial system and
take action when there was a threat.161 The Dodd-Frank Act then came
along and merged the OTS into the OCC.162 Dodd-Frank added Section
6(a) to HOLA, providing that every preemption determination made by
a court or agency under HOLA “shall be made in accordance with the
laws and legal standards applicable to national banks regarding the
preemption of State law.”163 Section 6(b) provides that HOLA “does not
158.
159.
160.
161.

Eggert, supra note 3, at 173; CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 3, at 13.
Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 1046, § 1465(a)–(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 2017.
Dodd-Frank Act § 1044 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25b).
Michael Barr, Address at the Pew/New York University Stern Conference on
Financial Reform: The Dodd-Frank Act, One Year On (June 27, 2011), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2011/06/27-dodd-frank-barr.
162. See Dodd-Frank Act § 312 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5412).
163. Dodd-Frank Act § 1046 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1465).
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occupy the field in any area of State law.”164 Preemption under HOLA
is now governed by the conflict preemption standard outlined in Barnett
Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson.165
The most restrictive procedures against preemption apply when a
state consumer financial law is at issue.166 Under Dodd-Frank,
preemption of a state consumer financial law will be permissible only if:
(i) application of the state law would have a discriminatory effect on
national banks or federal thrifts as compared to state banks; (ii) the state
law is preempted under a judicial standard that requires a state consumer
financial law to prevent or significantly interfere with the exercise of the
national bank’s or federal thrift’s powers before it can be preempted,
with such preemption determination being made by the OCC or by a
court on a case-by-case basis; or (iii) the state law is preempted by
another provision of federal law other than Title X of the Dodd-Frank
Act.167 Thus, under Dodd-Frank, a consumer financial protection law
will not automatically be preempted as it would under 560.2(b), even if
it “purport[s] to impose requirements regarding . . . [p]rocessing,
origination, servicing, sale or purchase of, or investment or participation
in mortgages.”168 Under Dodd-Frank, preemption occurs only on a caseby-case basis, and a decision by federal regulators is applicable only to
the individual state law and substantially equivalent laws.169 DoddFrank is silent on laws that are not “state consumer financial” laws. If a
law is not a state consumer financial law, the OCC presumably has the
power to preempt it using traditional conflict preemption analysis.170
In response to the Dodd-Frank Act, the OCC issued an Interim
Final Rule that supersedes 12 C.F.R. § 560.2.171 The OCC Preemption
Rules, effective July 21, 2011, rescinded subsidiary preemption, laws

164.
165.

Id.
Id.; see Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996) (holding that conflict
preemption applies to national banks).
166. Dodd-Frank Act § 1044. A state consumer financial law is a law that does not
discriminate against national banks directly and specifically regulates the manner,
content, terms, and conditions of any financial transaction or account as it relates to
consumers.
167. Id.
168. 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(b)(10) (2012).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See Office of Thrift Supervision Integration, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,950 (Aug. 9,
2011).

2013]

HOLA PREEMPTION

593

impairing banks “incidental powers,”172 and conformed HOLA to NBA
preemption.173 Although the regulations removed the “occupy the field”
language found in HOLA regulations, the new regulations maintain the
laundry list of fiduciary laws found in §560.2(b) of HOLA that are
preempted.174 On its face, the preservation of the list violates part of the
Dodd-Frank mandate to conduct a case-by-case analysis. The new
regulations explicitly apply Barnett Bank only for the list of laws not
explicitly preempted in §560.2(c) of the HOLA regulations, which
includes real property, homestead, tort, and criminal law.175 Thus, as
written and enforced by the OCC, state consumer finance laws are the
only laws clearly protected by Dodd-Frank. Other state laws remain
open to interpretation by the courts and the OCC, possibly in keeping
with the prevalent approaches to HOLA.
In addition to structural reforms to the lending and deposit taking
institutions, Title X of Dodd-Frank also created the CFPB to consolidate
federal consumer protection into one place.176 The CFPB is tasked with
educating consumers, monitoring financial products, and restricting
deceptive trade practices.177 The new Bureau regulates consumer
financial products and services in compliance with federal law.178 The
CFPB is tasked with implementing and enforcing federal consumer
financial law to ensure that consumers have access to markets for
consumer financial products and services, and that such markets are
“fair, transparent, and competitive.”179
The Bureau is placed within the Federal Reserve System but
operates independently.180 Under the Act, the CFPB is given broad
regulatory, supervisory, and enforcement authority over “covered
persons” and “service providers.”181 These are with respect to both new
consumer financial protection provisions, as well as an array of existing
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

12 C.F.R. § 7.4009 (2012).
12 U.S.C. § 25b(b).
12 C.F.R. § 7.4009.
Id.
Dodd-Frank Act tit. X (codified as 12 U.S.C. §§ 5511–5519).
Id.
Id. § 1021.
Id. § 1021(a). A director who is appointed by the President, with the advice
and consent of the Senate, for a term of five years, heads the Bureau. Id. § 1011.
Although the advice and consent of the Senate is required, the current Director was
appointed during recess due to partisan objections to the Dodd-Frank Act and the
creation of the CFPB.
180. Id.
181. Id. §§ 1014–15.
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federal consumer financial protection laws and provisions that are to be
transferred to the CFPB from existing federal banking agencies.182
Therefore, the CFPB has control over residential lenders of all varieties,
including non-bank institutions.
After a one-year “stand up” period, the Bureau obtained
enforcement authority and commenced most activities on July 21,
2011.183 However, the CFPB did not have a Director until January of
2012. President Obama used a recess appointment to select Richard
Cordray, thus avoiding a battle with the Senate. Going forward, the
CFPB has vowed to overhaul the home mortgage market over a sixmonth period beginning in July 2012.184 As of April 2013, new
regulations have included rules related to disclosure forms, information
provided to consumers when obtaining a mortgage, and more
transparency in mortgage servicing.185 In January 2013, the CFPB
issued new rules regarding mortgage servicing.186 In the preamble to the
Mortgage Servicing Final Rules, the Bureau makes it clear that
Regulation X does not preempt the field of mortgage servicing
regulations by states.187 On April 19, 2013, CFPB released additional
proposals addressing questions related to mortgages. The proposal
includes yet another clarification that Regulation X does not preempt the
field and recommends a comment emphasizing the point.188
To date, the CFPB has been over-extended, slow moving, and the
subject of partisan political debates. If banks still have the option of
raising preemption, even if only as a defense, the issue of laborious and
costly litigation has not been resolved. The need for repeated
clarifications from the Bureau is reflective of hesitance from the courts
182.
183.
184.

Id.
Dodd-Frank Act § 1017.
Edward Wyatt, Loans Top A To-Do List: New Agency Plans to Make over
Mortgage Market, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2012, at B1.
185. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CONSUMER
FINANCIAL
PROTECTION
BUREAU
(July
2012),
available
at
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/reports/semi-annual-report/.
186. See High-Cost Mortgage and Homeownership Counseling Amendments to the
Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z) and Homeownership Counseling Amendments to
the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 Fed. Reg. 6855 (Jan. 31,
2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024).
187. Id.
188. See Amendments to the 2013 Mortgage Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement
Procedure Act (Regulation X) and Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg.
25,638 (proposed May 2, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 1024 and 1026).
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to apply the Dodd-Frank preemption standard. Other changes proposed
by the CFPB thus far may help customers obtaining new mortgages, but
those with existing mortgages are stuck in limbo. Additionally, the
availability of upfront cost estimates will not fix wrongful foreclosure
and other servicing problems. While the Bureau’s attempts at keeping
borrowers informed is helpful, consumer disclosure and paperwork
requirements will not prevent the OCC from overstepping its authority,
nor will it combat a banker’s ability to delay a homeowner’s recovery in
the face of egregious behavior by utilizing the court system.
Dodd-Frank created a regulatory scheme that is vulnerable to the
changing political climate. Even if the measures are left intact, history
shows us that while these measures may help prevent a crisis exactly
like the current recession, they may not be adequate to produce lasting
overall reform within the financial industry.189 “Dodd-Frank . . . relies
primarily on the same supervisory tool—capital-based regulation—that
failed to prevent the banking and thrift crises of the 1980s as well as the
recent financial crisis.”190 Historically, Congress and federal regulators
have been unable to resolve consumer protection issues without industry
involvement, which results in less restrictive regulations.191
The recent crisis is evidence of how detrimental the relationship
between federal regulators and industry players can be to
homeowners.192 Post-Dodd-Frank homeowners are still forced to
address the preemption question, even if only to protest removal.193 The
case-by-case requirement found in Dodd-Frank, if ever applied, is not
enough to shelter homeowners from the influence that financial
institutions have on federal regulators. Preemption, even case-by-case
conflict preemption, can still act as a carrot to bait institutions to use the
federal charter system, particularly if the courts continue to find federal
preemption when interpreting HOLA. Looking forward, homeowners
seeking to make the best of the situation will continue to face avoidance
and aggressive court action by banks with federal thrift charters.

189.
190.

See supra Part II.A (discussing the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s).
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate
Response to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 1053 (2011).
191. See id.; cf. Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Jager, Reforming Regulation in the
Markets for Home Loans, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 681, 692–93 (2011).
192. See, e.g., CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 3.
193. See infra Part III.C.
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B. THE NBA PREEMPTION STANDARD
Historically, national banks have been subject to greater state
control than federal thrifts.194 Preemption under the NBA, and going
forward HOLA, follows the Barnett Bank conflict preemption standard.
NBA preemption has always been narrower than HOLA.195 National
banks are given “all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to
carry on the business of banking.”196 The OCC defines the incidental
powers; in the context of mortgage lending, “state laws of general
application, which merely require all businesses to refrain from
fraudulent, unfair, or illegal behavior, do not necessarily impair a bank’s
ability to exercise its real estate lending powers.”197
The National Bank Act preemption provision states:
Except where made applicable by Federal law, state laws that
obstruct, impair or condition a national bank’s ability to fully
exercise its Federally authorized real estate lending powers do not
apply to national banks. Specifically, a national bank may make real
estate loans…without regard to state law limitations concerning: (10)
Processing, origination, servicing, sale or purchase of, or investment
198
or participation in mortgages.

The language does not declare occupation of the field, as HOLA
did in 560.2(c).
Instead, the NBA regulations codify conflict
preemption. The NBA regulation contains a savings clause similar to
HOLA, excepting state contract, tort, criminal, homestead, debt
collection, taxation, zoning, real property, and any other law that only
incidentally affects national banks’ real estate lending powers.199
Conflict preemption occurs when there is an actual conflict
between state and federal law, such as when compliance with both laws
194. See, e.g. Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 222 (1997) (National banks “are
subject to the laws of the State, and are governed in their daily course of business far
more by the laws of the State than of the nation. All their contracts are governed and
construed by State laws. Their acquisition and transfer of property, their right to collect
their debts, and their liability to be sued for debts, are all based on State law. It is only
when State law incapacitates the [national] banks from discharging their duties to the
[federal] government that it becomes unconstitutional”).
195. For an analysis of banking history, see supra Part I.
196. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2006).
197. Martinez v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg. Inc., 598 F.3d 549, 555 (9th Cir. 2009).
198. 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a)(10) (2012).
199. Id. § 34.4(b).

2013]

HOLA PREEMPTION

597

would be a “physical impossibility.”200 Though there was no direct
conflict between state and federal laws in Barnett Bank v. Nelson—the
case that produced the standard applied to both NBA and HOLA
institutions under Dodd-Frank—the state law was still an obstacle to
accomplishing the federal law’s objectives.201 As a result, the NBA
preempted that law. Barnett Bank involves a Florida law prohibiting
banks from selling insurance, unless the bank is located in a small town
and not affiliated with a larger institution.202 Barnett Bank bought a
Florida licensed insurance agency with the plan of selling insurance
through bank branches in towns with a population of over 5,000, which
was in violation of the Florida Law.203 The Supreme Court sided with
Barnett Bank, holding that the Florida law interfered with a power
explicitly granted by Congress204 and that Florida could not prevent
banks from engaging in the insurance business. Even though it did not
directly contradict federal law, the Florida law was an obstacle to a
power that Congress intended to grant to national banks.205
In analyzing whether the NBA preempts state foreclosure laws,
courts have held that they do not conflict with a federal right and thus
are not preempted.206 Citing the Supreme Court, the Tamburri court
holds “[t]he NBA leaves national banks subject to the laws of the State,
and banks are governed in their daily course of business far more by the
laws of the State than of the nation.”207 The court also notes the states’
“longstanding interest in regulating the foreclosure process.”208 Per the
Dodd-Frank Act, this analysis should apply to loans made by institutions
governed by HOLA. If courts apply the NBA standard to HOLA,
consumer finance laws as well as state foreclosure laws will not be
preempted due to the state’s longstanding interest in regulating the
foreclosure process. In addition, the scope of authority held by federal

200.
201.

Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996).
Id. at 33 (stating that preemption occurs where a state law “prevent[s] or
significantly interfere[s] with the national bank’s exercise of its powers” as determined
by federal law).
202. Id. at 28–29.
203. Id. at 29.
204. Id. at 31.
205. Id.
206. Tamburri v. Suntrust Mortg., Inc., 875 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1018 (N.D. Cal.
2012) (citation omitted).
207. Id. (quoting Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 222 (1997) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
208. Id. (citing BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 541–44 (1994)).
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thrifts will change and they will face significantly more regulation by
state entities.
Although the NBA provides the OCC with less preemptive power,
preemption was not the only tool used by federal regulators to shelter
banks from state regulation.209 Notably, nationally chartered banks
included Bank of America, Citibank, and Wachovia, some of the biggest
players in the financial collapse.210 Dodd-Frank does not stop the OCC
from aggressively attempting to quash state regulations, as it did during
the most recent crisis.
C. HOLA PREEMPTION IN THE COURTS SINCE DODD-FRANK
Dodd-Frank does not apply to mortgages signed before the Act
took effect; thus, homeowners who entered into mortgages before July
21, 2011 are still unprotected.211 The Act does not alter the applicability
of prior regulations, but since it clarifies the prior law it should influence
the interpretation. However, to date, it is impossible to know what
impact the Dodd-Frank Act will have on litigation. Thus far, courts
continue to follow the judicial interpretations of OTS regulations
prevalent within the circuit without regard for Dodd-Frank.212 This
uncertainty and lack of court interpretation is hurtful to homeowners.
Courts rely on Congress’ failure to make Dodd-Frank retroactive in
order to avoid an analysis of the Act and the new OCC regulations. For
example, in Davis v. World Savings Bank,213 the court does not rely on
Dodd-Frank or the interim regulations to influence its interpretation of
HOLA preemption. The court explained:
On July 21, 2011, OTS was transferred to the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency pursuant to a new statute, the Dodd209.
210.
211.

CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 3, at 13.
CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 3, at 13.
Dodd-Frank is not intended to be retroactive. Regulations and statutes cannot
be applied retroactively absent express direction from Congress. See Bowen v.
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (“Congressional enactments and
administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their
language requires this result.”). Dodd-Frank provides that the governing section of the
statute was enacted and amended effective on the transfer date, July 21, 2011, which
means that it does not apply to loans originated before that date. See Dodd-Frank Act
§§ 1046, 1047(b), 1048.
212. See, e.g., infra notes 213–26 and accompanying text.
213. Davis v. World Sav. Bank, F.S.B., 806 F. Supp. 2d 159 (D.D.C. 2011).

2013]

HOLA PREEMPTION

599

Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 . . .
. Effective 90 days after the transfer date, the OTS will be abolished.
. . . The Dodd-Frank Act provides that HOLA does not occupy the
field in any area of state law and that preemption is governed by the
standards applicable to national banks. . . . The OCC has issued an
Interim Final Rule that changes the preemption regulations . . . . The
new regulation, however, does not govern this case because
regulations, like statutes, cannot be applied retroactively absent
express direction from Congress . . . . Congress did not direct
retroactive application of the new regulation, and the Dodd-Frank
Act provided that section 1465 of Title 12 was enacted and amended
effective on the transfer date, i.e. July 21, 2011. . . . Section 560.2
governs here because it was the regulation in effect when the parties
214
entered into the Pick-a-Payment mortgage loan transaction.

Other cases have followed the Davis analysis, continuing to apply the
OTS regulations to all loans without considering Dodd-Frank.215
In Molosky v. Washington Mutual, Inc., the court not only
confirmed that Dodd-Frank is not retroactive, but also held that HOLA
preemption still applies to both a bank that originates loans and those
servicing such loans.216 The Molosky holding reveals that to adequately
protect the rights of homeowners, courts need further guidance from
Congress. For loans signed before July 2011, a lender can still avoid
state law by merely transferring the loan to a federal entity, acquiring a
federal entity, or switching its charter. The Molosky plaintiff did not
sign a loan with a federal institution, but is subjected to federal
regulations and foreclosed from adequately asserting state law claims
simply due to the nature of the institution servicing the loan.217 Such an
outcome does not protect consumers, enhance the market, or fulfill the
original intent of HOLA.
Although NBA regulations and precedent clearly indicate an
intention to allow states to regulate foreclosures as well as other areas of
law that are traditionally of special interest to them, in some
circumstances courts have ignored the spirit of Dodd-Frank and
continued to adhere to a strict as applied analysis, without regard for

214.
215.

Id. at 166 n.5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Molosky v. Washington Mut., Inc., 664 F.3d 109, 113 (6th Cir. 2011)
(confirming that the Dodd-Frank amendments to HOLA affecting preemption are not
retroactive, and so, concluding that the OTS Regulations mandating field preemption
still apply to mortgages that predate the enactment of Dodd-Frank).
216. Id. at 114–15.
217. Id.
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harm to homeowners. Copeland-Turner v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 218
involves a foreclosure-related action with conversion claims arising out
of Wells Fargo’s alleged failure to record an assignment, its issuance of
an invalid notice of default, and its failure to honor an oral agreement to
stay sales during loan modification and re-application.219 Plaintiffs
argued that Dodd-Frank’s amendments to HOLA changed the nature
and analysis of HOLA preemption.220 Citing § 1043 of the Dodd-Frank
Act, the court holds that the Act is not meant to apply to contracts
entered into before enactment.221
In Sovereign Bank v. Sturgis,222 the U.S. District Court for
Massachusetts held that HOLA preempted the Massachusetts Consumer
Credit Cost Disclosure Act, a law regulating disclosures regarding
credit.223 The court analyzed the statute under OTS regulations without
mention of the Dodd-Frank Act or consumer financial protection laws,
holding that since the law purports to impose requirements regarding
disclosures, it is preempted by HOLA pursuant to 12 C.F.R.
560.2(b)(9).224 While analyzing the plaintiff’s other claims, the Sturgis
court followed the prevailing view for pure common law claims, finding
that a breach of contract claim was not preempted because “courts have
regularly held that when a federally chartered bank violates a specific
clause of a mortgage contract, HOLA will not preempt the resulting
breach of contract claim.”225 When faced with a state consumer
protection law and common law claims, the Sturgis court engaged in a
more in-depth analysis relying on OTS opinion letters, but not the
guidance provided by Dodd-Frank.226
Dodd-Frank declares that HOLA no longer occupies the field in
any area of state law, but rather preemption is governed by the standards
applicable to national banks; it is intended to clarify existing OTS
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

800 F. Supp. 2d 1132, (D. Or. 2011).
Id. at 1134.
Id. at 1137.
Id. at 1137–38.
863 F. Supp. 2d 75 (2012).
Id.
Id. at 103.
Id. at 94 (citing McAnaney v. Astoria Fin. Corp., 665 F. Supp. 2d 132, 164
(E.D.N.Y. 2009) (“The breach of contract claim . . . does not seek to impose specific
substantive requirements upon the operations of defendants, apart from compliance
with specific contractual obligations . . . . The claim is therefore not preempted . . . .”)).
226. Id. at 96–98.
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regulations.227 However, courts continue to follow precedent, not the
congressional advisory.228 This begs the question of whether courts will
ever apply the same standard to federal thrifts that are applied to
national banks, or if instead, those facing litigation with a federal thrift
will be saddled with additional unnecessary steps to adequate recovery.
To date, it is still unclear what method a court may use to determine
preemption under the Act. Presently, courts are continuing to follow
two distinct standards for HOLA and NBA preemption based on the fact
that the Dodd-Frank Act is not retroactive.229 Even when a suit
regarding a loan originating after the effective date comes before a
court, the court may rely on the spirit and intentions of HOLA, as
opposed to the NBA, to continue to permit more preemption. PostDodd-Frank holdings give the impression that courts may never fully
apply the same standard to federal thrifts that they do to national
banks.230 This uncertainty does not ensure public access to home
financing or ensure the solvency of federal savings associations.231
It is difficult to determine exactly how Dodd-Frank will impact
residential lending by federal thrifts. Many existing loans cannot be
protected by new state laws that aim at curbing subprime lending, robosigning, wrongful foreclosure, or other egregious behavior. Therefore,
even with the new standards, Dodd-Frank does not fix the problem. The
possible conflict preemption analysis, assuming courts and the OCC
follow the legislative requirements, makes future litigation with thrifts
difficult for both homeowners and federal thrifts. Under Dodd-Frank,
thrifts are unsure if they will have to comply with state or federal
regulations, while homeowners are still being forced to litigate the most
egregious mortgages in federal court without state law protection.
Dodd-Frank has taken steps to prevent another crisis similar to the
recent meltdown, but it does not address the underlying cause. In the
last forty years, the original purpose of HOLA has not been considered.
Perhaps instead of regulating these institutions, the solution is to repeal

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

See supra Part III.B.
See supra notes 224–39 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 216–34 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 216–34 and accompanying text.
See H.R. REP. NO. 73-210 (1933) (Conf. Rep.); see also Davis v. World Sav.
Bank, F.S.B., 806 F. Supp. 2d 159, 166 (D.D.C. 2011) (“In order to ensure that the
public had access to home financing and to ensure the solvency of federal savings
associations, OTS regulated federal savings associations through a uniform set of
regulations that occupied the entire field of lending regulation . . . .”).
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the charter or to allow the market to correct itself and eliminate the
charter.
IV. THE ELIMINATION OF HOLA BENEFITS ALL PARTIES
The history of federal thrifts has shown that reforming regulations
is not enough. Attempts to protect federal thrifts have resulted in a
vicious cycle of financial crises, despite regulations developed with the
intent of protecting the stability of these institutions and preventing
another meltdown.232 Since the 1970s, thrifts have not made a profit
without the benefit of protection from the federal government or
deviation from their original purpose.233 Thus far, all attempts at
incentivizing banks to maintain the thrift charter have conflicted with
the purpose of HOLA and caused harm to homeowners. Dodd-Frank
attempted to correct the issues of inadequate oversight; however, the Act
created a regulatory scheme that is vulnerable to the changing political
climate, just like the financial legislation that preceded it.234
Due to the political climate and recent history of financial
regulation, it is vital that the necessity of HOLA-based federal thrifts be
reevaluated. The recent crisis has shown that federal thrifts need little to
no protection. The market is complex enough, there are numerous
sources of residential loans, and it is clear that federal thrifts cannot
compete in the market without favorable treatment by the government.
Concerns regarding over-regulation and the difficulty of complying with
multiple states’ rules are unsupported. It is clear that banks have the
sophistication to determine which state is best for their interests and
which forum—state or federal—will result in more favorable litigation
outcomes. Even with the removal of the preemption assumption, banks
may still draw out the litigation process.
There are numerous reasons to eliminate the federal thrift charter
and minimize the option of charter shopping. HOLA no longer serves
its intended purpose, and in fact impedes the very process it was
designed to aid. The mortgage industry will not disappear if federal
thrifts are eliminated. However, homeowners will have one less barrier
to court access. HOLA is no longer a primary source of lending, but is
instead a tool for preemption and other trial tactics. With the remaining
232.
233.
234.

See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part III.A.
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federal legislation and entities in place, the federal regulatory scheme
will continue to exist. In essence, HOLA is redundant; its benefits, if
any, are to the lenders and not to the homeowners.
The sections below outline how the elimination of HOLA would be
beneficial to homeowners and states, and how banks may be impacted
by the elimination of the federal thrift charter. Given that HOLA is no
longer necessary, eliminating the federal thrift charter may be the best
solution for all parties. Homeowners would benefit from consistent
regulations, easier access to the courts, and adequate remedies for the
egregious behavior of lenders. The states would regain some control of
areas historically within their domain: real estate, consumer protection,
and the mortgage contract.
Dodd-Frank has eliminated field
preemption, believed to be the largest perk of the thrift charter, and has
created an element of uncertainty for the banks. If the elimination of
field preemption acts as a de facto repeal of HOLA, then the removal of
the federal thrift charter will have limited impact on lending institutions.
A. IMPACT ON HOMEOWNERS
Home equity is the single largest source of wealth for most
Americans,235 and for many it accounts for more than 50% of their
assets.236 Homeowner equity is a critical factor in moving up the
economic ladder; as a result, the loss of a home can mean complete
financial ruin for many Americans. Over the course of the financial
crisis, Americans lost six trillion dollars in home equity, and as of spring
2011 more than one in five homes was in a negative equity position.237
Courts have not only applied HOLA when a federal thrift originates
the loan and initiates foreclosure, but also when a federal thrift
originates the loan but the thrift is later sold, or when a federal thrift
merely services a loan.238 These changes are outside the control of the
homeowner, who has no say in the negotiations of the mortgage sale or
the selection of the servicing entity. Yet, homeowners’ rights change
after the execution of the contract in a way that is extremely detrimental.
235. Frank E. Nothaft and Yan Chang, Refinance and the Accumulation of Home
Equity Wealth¸ in BUILDING ASSETS BUILDING CREDIT 71 (Nicolas P. Retsinas & Eric
S. Belsky eds., 2005).
236. Id.
237. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., EVIDENCE MATTERS: TRANSFORMING
KNOWLEDGE INTO HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT POLICY ’(2011), available
at http://www.huduser.org/portal/publications/EM_Newsletter_Spring_2011_FNL.pdf.
238. See, e.g., Molosky v. Washington Mut., Inc., 664 F.3d 109 (6th Cir. 2011).
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Homeowners do not bargain for a federal court battle when they enter
into a mortgage with a state thrift that later transfers its charter, nor is
the average homeowner sophisticated enough to know the ramifications
of entering into a mortgage with a federal thrift. Thus, a homeowner
dealing with foreclosure should not be forced into federal court. When
faced with the prospect of losing the most significant measure of their
wealth, homeowners should be able to rely on longstanding state
foreclosure procedures and common law protections.
The resources necessary to fight a mortgage company in federal
court can be overwhelming, even when the bank is at fault. For the
homeowner, foreclosure or any legal conflict with a bank is a complex
and frustrating process. This, in part, is due to the nature of lending.
The mortgage lender is the financial institution that lends the
homeowner money, while the mortgage servicer handles the day-to-day
tasks of managing a loan. A loan servicer typically processes loan
payments, responds to borrower inquiries, keeps track of principal and
interest paid, manages an escrow account, and may initiate foreclosure.
The servicer may or may not be the same company that issued the loan.
In a case of foreclosure, a bank may transfer a note to a trustee to handle
the sale, adding yet another party to the equation.
If any party in such a case is a federal institution, federal
preemption may be invoked under HOLA and the NBA. While courts
generally agree that the NBA does not preempt foreclosure law,239 this
does not stop regulators from invoking preemption, nor does it prevent
the OCC from deterring states from taking action against financial
institutions.240 As established in Dodd-Frank, the CFPB should fill the
gap in consumer protection if federal regulators are going to attempt to
utilize supremacy to let federal institutions avoid compliance with state
laws. Unfortunately, to date, the actions of the Bureau have not risen to
the same level of protection that a consumer could receive from a
state.241 Federal regulation of financial institutions and instruments is
complex, but at the homeowner level, the desires are simpler.
Homeowners need a straightforward process for recovery and redress
when conflicts arise with their lenders. If homeowners face protracted

239. Tamburri v. Suntrust Mortg., Inc., 875 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1018 (N.D. Cal.
2012).
240. See, e.g., CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 3, at 13.
241. See supra Part III.A.
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litigation against a federal thrift, they risk losing their homes and are
saddled with large legal bills.
The argument that the existence of different levels of regulation
harms federal thrifts is not persuasive, as banks and thrifts are already
subject to state specific contract, tort, property, and other claims. This
argument is especially unpersuasive in light of HOLA’s purpose.
HOLA was not drafted to create and preserve an institution, nor was it
created as a profit source for the banking industry. Since the 1970s,
federal thrifts have moved away from their intended purpose and have
instead focused on competition, profits, and survival.242 Savings and
loans claim they need uniform laws to stay afloat, yet such uniformity
has not worked to prevent market collapse. Federal thrifts should not be
given the privilege of uniformity, including access to a federal forum,
when it is the homeowner that has suffered and bore the brunt of the
recent crisis. This outcome is precisely the opposite of what HOLA
originally intended.
Banks and thrifts are sophisticated and have more bargaining power
than homeowners, who secure loans from whichever institution offers
the lowest interest rate, or in this market, who will provide them a
mortgage at all. Consumers do not have the option of refusing a loan
based on the fact that an institution is a federal thrift that will subject
them to litigation in federal court in the event of a dispute. Thus,
homeowners are not in a fair bargaining position, even with the creation
of the CFBP and other changes to the market initiated by Dodd-Frank.
The elimination of the HOLA-based thrift charter, as well as any
corresponding regulatory measures taken to keep the thrifts solvent, will
provide relief for homeowners beyond what is attempted by DoddFrank.
B. IMPACT ON STATES
The Supreme Court has long recognized that “[p]roperty interests
are created and defined by state law.”243 Unlike most scenarios in which
forum shopping may arise, a real property plaintiff typically only has
two choices—state or federal—because a state has dominion and control
of the property within its borders.244 Unlike torts and other causes of
action, only federal preemption can override a state’s ability to hear a
242.
243.
244.

See supra Part II.A.
Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55–56 (1979).
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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case involving a property claim within its territory. Therefore, charter
shopping and preemption by a federal institution can infringe not only
on a plaintiff’s rights, but on a state’s rights as well.
A state has the ability to be progressive or conservative and to
contradict national trends if it is the will of its citizens. Due to full faith
and credit,245 state regulations have the power to create sweeping
reforms. In the case of banking, a bank’s ability to switch charters, or
even change the character of its institution, creates a market-based check
on state overregulation. If state regulations are overly restrictive, a bank
can choose to avoid the market altogether—a prospect that could be
catastrophic to a state’s economy. Thus, the market provides both an
incentive to lend and an incentive for states to strike a regulatory
balance. Federal involvement is not necessary to encourage either the
banks or the states. In the recent meltdown, even as signs of an
impending housing crisis appeared and states attempted to curb the
impact, banks did not cease to engage in residential lending in the face
of action by the states. Instead, institutions switched charters and used
their resources to fight attorney generals, deny homeowner access to the
courts, and influence regulators.246
The federal government has proven that it is slow to react to
changes in the residential mortgage industry, and that the changing tides
in Washington can have a major impact on its regulation of mortgage
servicing.247 The OCC and CFPB, which have a dual incentive to
preserve banking and protect consumers, are slow to react and operate in
a hostile climate. Dodd-Frank conformed HOLA to NBA preemption;
however, to date the OCC regulations have not fully eliminated all of
the preemptive preferences outlined in the HOLA regulations.248
Further, while the CFPB has been tasked with filling the gaps in
consumer protection regulations within the federal system, to date there
are no federal regulations in existence to mirror the state causes of
action that are still preempted by HOLA.249 Meanwhile, states continue
to face preemption in connection with some of the worst mortgages due
to Dodd-Frank’s failure to apply retroactively.

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
See supra Part I.
See supra Parts I and III.A.
See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part III.A.
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States have proven that they are capable of adapting to an
impending crisis faster than the federal government. In the face of
opposition from the OTS and OCC, many states continued to advance
legislation to regulate financial institutions. In 1999, North Carolina
passed legislation establishing a 5% fee trigger—a rate 3% lower than
the federal regulations—that designated a loan as high risk and
subjected it to state regulation. North Carolina’s act also banned
prepayment penalties for mortgages under $150,000 and prohibited loan
flipping (repeated refinancing).250 Eventually, the OCC joined the
OTS’s efforts to restrain state activities in regulations issued in 2004. In
2006 alone, state attorney generals launched more than 3,000
enforcement actions.251 States also teamed up to produce large
settlements with banks. In the face of HOLA preemption, other states
followed North Carolina, and by 2007, twenty-nine states and the
District of Columbia had passed anti-predatory lending legislation.252
Instead of changing their behavior, banks and thrifts relied on
preemption to evade state legislation, thus worsening the impact of the
financial crisis. When homeowners filed suit against lenders pursuant to
state legislation aimed at combating wrongful lending practices, thrifts
and national banks raised preemption as a defense, thereby prolonging
litigation and usurping state control.
It is clear from HOLA’s intent that the OTS has overstepped its
bounds, and that legislative efforts to keep thrifts afloat have completely
shifted the focus. The mortgage crisis proved that banking and
securities regulations are subject to the whims of politics. For example,
an era of deregulation led to the lingering financial crisis, which was in
part caused by a historical number of mortgage defaults and
foreclosures. With much of state revenues linked to the value of
property, particularly in states that do not have an income tax, OTS and
OCC regulations have resulted in a catastrophic impact on state
revenues. Congress never intended for the OTS to preempt state laws
with regulations and then fail to enact similar protections for consumers.
Unfortunately, the OTS had no incentive to enact consumer protection

250. CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 3, at 96 (citing Raphael W. Bostic et al.,
State and Local Anti-Predatory Lending Laws: The Effect of Legal Enforcement
Mechanisms, 60 J. ECON. & BUS. 47 (2008)).
251. Id. (citing Mortgage Market Turmoil—Causes and Consequences: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 33 (2007)
(statement of Joseph A. Smith, Jr., North Carolina Commissioner of Banks)).
252. Id.
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legislation—particularly since the budget of the OTS is funded with fees
paid by the very banks it regulated.
Real estate law has always varied from state to state, but this
variation has not impacted access to credit to date. States are financially
incentivized to protect homeowners because many states rely on
property taxes as a primary source of revenue. As a result, it is in a
state’s interest to prevent foreclosures because it is inevitable that they
will impact property values, impose costs on state and local
governments, and lead to an increase in crime. States cannot create
money like the federal government, with access to the Federal Reserve,
and in times of economic crisis, states encounter the same limited
availability of credit and higher interest rates as private citizens and
entities. In addition, the recent crisis proves that industries and lobbyists
induce federal regulators to create lax regulations that cause harm to
consumers. At the very least this influence slows down the process of
developing reforms, and at its worst it can leave homeowners
completely unprotected. Thus, states are in the best position to
implement laws to protect the interests of homeowners within their
jurisdiction.
Therefore, the problem is not a particular agency.253 An analysis of
the most recent crisis indicates that the problem may be federal
intervention within areas that are better regulated by the states. While
preemption is based on a determination of congressional intent to
displace the police power of states, the recent use of HOLA to avoid
state court efforts to stall foreclosures and police high risk practices of
lenders warrants a reexamination of the Homeowner’s Loan Act. The
OTS declaration of field preemption places a federal agency in control
of an area better suited, and many would argue, intended to be statecontrolled. Dodd-Frank subjects thrifts to conflict preemption; however,
the Act does not consider whether federal intervention is necessary at all
or if the thrift is an institution worth preserving. The drafters ignored
the default presumption against preemption254 and instead sought to
create a less damaging regime. The outcome of the financial crisis
confirms that the federal thrifts’ interest in maintaining consistent
regulations does not outweigh a state’s desire to curb predatory lending
253. Dain C. Donelson & David Zaring, Requiem for a Regulator: the Office of
Thrift Supervision’s Performance During the Financial Crisis, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1777,
1780 (2011).
254. For a discussion of federalism and preemption, see infra Part I.
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or other high-risk behavior in the interest of economic stability. Conflict
preemption may not provide states with adequate authority to regulate
thrifts, as demonstrated by the actions of the OCC. Banks should not
have the option to charter shop or forum shop in the face of state
attempts at regulation that are still more restrictive and punitive than
federal equivalents.
Because states are quicker to react to changes in the lending market
and have an interest in controlling issues related to real estate
transactions within their borders, state actions should not be preempted.
The solution is simple in light of HOLA’s purpose: HOLA should be
eliminated. This will provide the states with the authority they need to
protect homeowners, real estate values, and revenue. Through the
repeal of HOLA states will regain some of the control necessary to
prevent another crisis, or at least lessen the impact of negative
influences on the residential real estate market.
C. IMPACT ON BANKS
Since the 1970s, federal thrifts have fought a losing battle to
maintain market share and remain profitable. Competition from nonbank lenders, unrestricted by federal banking rules, has created a market
in which it is difficult for federal thrifts to survive without government
intervention. The growth of the “shadow banking” system allowed
institutions performing the same market functions as banks to escape
regulation due to their corporate structure, while banks and thrifts used
subsidiaries within the shadow banking system to move activities off
balance sheet and outside the reach of more stringent regulation.255 It is
nearly impossible for thrifts to remain solvent because hedge funds,
investment banks, brokerage funds, and other institutions have been
allowed to offer the same financial products without the restrictions that
thrifts face. The recent crisis has proven that the remedy is not to
expand the scope of control for large banks and thrifts—such as
engaging in the same practices as non-deposit taking financial
institutions—which creates perverse incentives by creating “too-big-tofail” institutions.256

255. Barr, Address on Financial Reform: The Dodd-Frank Act, One Year On, supra
note 161.
256. HAMID MEHRAN, ALAN MORRISON & JOEL SHAPIRO, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK
OF NEW YORK STAFF REPORT No. 502: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND BANKS: WHAT
HAVE WE LEARNED FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS? 18–19 (2011) (discussing how
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The savings and loan crisis of the 1980s proved that eliminating the
restrictions on federal thrifts does not increase solvency. FIRREA’s
changes to HOLA, as well as the adoption of uniform governance and a
strong jurisdictional preference for thrifts through field preemption, also
failed to prevent a near-collapse. This phenomenon does not indicate a
need for looser federal guidelines or the creation of additional incentives
to entice banks to hold federal thrift charters. Instead, it is evidence that
the economic situation that prompted the development of HOLA has
disappeared, and that the thrift charter is no longer necessary to stabilize
residential lending.
Under Dodd-Frank, all aspects of a financial institution, regardless
of the form, will be subject to federal oversight under the CFPB. Many
argue that the additional oversight proposed by Dodd-Frank outweighs
any benefits of maintaining a thrift charter, particularly in the absence of
field preemption. This is particularly true for institutions that relied on
subsidiary preemption to extend field preemption to other aspects of
their business. It is possible that in the face of competition from nonbank institutions and with the option of switching to a state charter, the
Dodd-Frank changes will act to eliminate the federal thrift charter purely
through economic forces.
There have always been disadvantages to maintaining a federal
thrift charter; yet, at the height of the era of lending that sparked the
financial crisis, federal thrift loans accounted for as many as one third of
all mortgage loans originated in the U.S.257 This may be because the
OTS allowed federal thrifts to engage in activities unrelated to
residential lending and to enjoy protection of deposits by the FDIC,
while not being subject to states’ attempts to minimize the impact of the
crisis or homeowners’ attempts to recover under state laws.258 With
these perks eliminated, much of what remains after Dodd-Frank are the
downsides of maintaining a thrift charter. Federal thrifts continue to
face a lending limit for commercial loans equal to 20% of total assets,259
as well as a cap on nonresidential real property loans set at 400% of
capital.260 Thrifts are also prohibited from making secured consumer
allowing banks to become too big to fail through expanded scope of activities and
conglomeration may have weakened the market).
257. See supra Part I for a discussion of the role of federal thrifts in the financial
crisis.
258. Id.
259. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(2)(A) (2006); 12 C.F.R. § 560.30 (2012).
260. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(2)(B).
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loans and from holding commercial paper and corporate debt securities
in excess of 35% of their assets.261 Although under the purview of the
CFPB, non-bank lenders are not subjected to restrictions of this
magnitude, even following the economic collapse. Dodd-Frank also
codifies the Supreme Court holding in Cuomo v. Clearing House
Association262 in §1047 of the Act, which will likely increase actions by
state attorney generals against institutions to enforce compliance with
non-preempted state laws. Although attorney general enforcement is
somewhat limited by the Dodd-Frank Act, the codification of Cuomo
will increase actions for reasons beyond the restrictions.263
Thus, while the only clear protection in Dodd-Frank applies to state
consumer protection laws, it is possible that Dodd-Frank will work to
eliminate the federal thrift because of its stance on preemption. The
uncertainty alone may cause banks to abandon the federal thrift charter.
To determine whether the thrift charter is worthwhile, banks must
determine whether the preemption standard of Dodd-Frank will provide
adequate protection from state regulation of activities. However, after
decades of relaxed restrictions, it is evident that the banks do not need
the ability to choose between federal and state thrifts. The institutions
do not need an incentive to engage in residential lending. HOLA was
drafted to provide a funding resource for homeowners, not a shelter for
the banks.
CONCLUSION
The refrain “too big to fail” is frequently used in reference to the
size of financial institutions and the impact that their failure would have
on the economy. Analysts attest that allowing the collapse of these
261.
262.

See id. § 1464(c)(2)(D).
557 U.S. 519, 529–30. Cuomo holds that even though the NBA preempted
state administrative oversight for national bank subsidiaries, state attorneys general
remained empowered to enforce state law. Cuomo also notes the OCC’s role in the
financial crisis. Writing for the atypical majority (which includes Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer), Justice Scalia states while the OCC has “visitorial
powers,” the right to examine the affairs of a corporation, that does not mean that it has
the exclusive right to enforcement. “A sovereign’s ‘visitorial powers’ and its power to
enforce the law are two different things. Contrary to what the [OCC’s] regulation says,
the National Bank Act pre-empts only the former.” Id. at 529. Scalia noted that states
“have always enforced their general laws against national banks—–and have enforced
their banking-related laws against national banks for at least 85 years.” Id. at 534.
263. Dodd-Frank Act § 1042(a)(2) (stating that an attorney general may not enforce
Dodd-Frank against federal savings associations without advising the CFPB).
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institutions would have led to an even more catastrophic economic
crisis. The Dodd-Frank Act is now necessary to prevent a similar crisis
from occurring. However, legislation does not address the tools that the
government gave to institutions in the interest of preventing the failures
that contributed to the collapse. In the last two decades, HOLA
preemption became a weapon against litigation by homeowners.
Many feel that deregulation and expansive preemption are at least
partially responsible for the severity of the housing crisis. Allowing
financial institutions to choose between state and federal charters with
varying degrees of regulations worked to the detriment of all parties
involved, with the homeowner bearing the brunt of the injury. Federal
institutions took advantage of supremacy and competed directly with
states for the business of banks. In response, states were forced to
expend resources to fight federal overstepping and to compete with the
federal government to maintain state institutions. Then, when the
system began to fail, banks took advantage of a combination of relaxed
federal laws and confusion stemming from uncertainty on which of the
numerous institutions were actually responsible.
Federal thrifts do not stabilize the housing market, but instead have
contributed to two major financial crises. Therefore, if federal thrifts
cannot survive in the market without incentives from the federal
government, they should be allowed to fail. Federal thrifts no longer
serve their original purpose and instead act counter to that purpose. By
repealing the federal thrift, the residential lending market will be
simplified for the consumer. The states will have one less obstacle to
overcome in promoting consumer protection and other laws favorable to
homeowners. Banks may also benefit from the elimination of a source
of uncertainty in a climate of extensive reforms. Because state laws can
adequately protect homeowners, and many of the perks of maintaining a
federal thrift have been removed, it is in the best interest of all parties to
eliminate the federal thrift charter.

